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DEFAMATION-RETRACTIONA BILL THAT DIDN'T PASS
The rapid growth of modern methods of communication
presents perplexing problems to the courts and legislatures of today. One of the most controversial among these problems is: To
what extent should the radio and television stations and newspapers be held liable for defamatory statements?
Having developed according to no particular plan,' the law of
defamation is generally said by the authorities to be insufficient to
meet current libel and slander controversies, even between individuals. 2 Reform is needed in the whole field of defamation,
and especially in that part which concerns newspapers and broadcasters since, on the one hand, the chance of defamation is greatly
increased, and on the other, the simple wrong is multiplied by the
vast number of people reached when the words are disseminated
through these means.
At common law the press and radio possessed no immunities
not shared by all individuals.3 Absolute liability was applied to
all cases of newspaper defamation 4 even if a retraction was made,
as a retraction was no defense.5 Absolute liability was also imposed in cases of radio defamation when the particular jurisdiction
considered such defamation as libel. The only relief afforded
broadcasters under common law principles was in those jurisdictions which considered radio defamation as slander: where the
words were not slanderous per se the person defamed had to prove
damages affecting his pecuniary interests.8
1

TORTS 778 (1941).
TORTS, 237 (12th ed. 1923); Courtney, Absurdities of the
Law of Slander and Libel, 36 Am. L. REv. 552 (1902).
"Edwards v. San Jose Printing Co., 99 Cal. 431, 34 Pac. 128 (1893); Louis2

PRossEn,
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ville Times Co. v. Lyttle, 257 Ky. 132, 77 S.W. 2d 482 (1934); Aldrich v. The

Press Printing Co., 9 Minn. 123 (1864).

"'All libel is actionable without proof that damage has occurred." PnossEa,
ToRTS 793 (1941). "It is well settled that in the absence of a statute newspapers
as such have no peculiar privilege, but are liable for what they publish in the
same manner as the rest of the community." 53 Corn,. Jur. SEC. 197 (1948). Also
see Hibschman, Liability of News Vendors or Distributorsfor Libel, 5 Jonr MaRSHALL L. Q. 416, 421 (1902); McComvncK, D~mGEs 422-423 (1935).
' Supra note 1 at 856.
*44 AM. Ju. 196 (1942).
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One common legislative device to deflect the harsh effect of
the common law rules when applied to news disseminators is to
use retraction as a mitigating factor. As early as 1910 the Kentucky General Assembly passed a statute, now Kentucky Revised
Statutes 411.050, 7 which limited the liability of one who published
a false and libelous statement if the statement was made without
malice and a sufficient retraction was printed. In such cases no
punitive damages were allowed, and the retraction could be
pleaded in mitigation of any actual damages. In Kentucky at the
present time a defamed person will be allowed recompense for injuries to his occupation, business, reputation, and character, and
for humiliation and mental distress.8 However, if there is no
actual malice and a retraction is made, no punitive or vindictive
damages will be allowed. 9
Statutes concerning retraction in mitigation of damages have
been passed in the majority of states. These statutes vary, of
course, as to the amount of relief given. They can, however, be
divided into six general classifications, beginning with those most
favorable to the person defamed:
1. Statutes allowing retraction in mitigation of puntive
damages only. 10
2. Statutes allowing retraction in mitigation of all dam11
ages.
3. Statutes providing that any "mitigating circumstances"
will reduce damages.' 2 Retraction is generally regarded
3
as a relevant mitigating circumstance.'
4. Statutes providing that the plaintiff may recover no punitive, but all actual damages if a retraction has been
4
made.1

'Ky.

STAT. 2488b-1 (Carroll, 1915).
'McClintock v. McClure, 171 Ky. 714, 188 S.W. 867 (1916).
'Reid v. Nichols, 166 Ky. 423, 179 S.W. 440 (1915).
104

MICH. Com. LAWS sec. 620.23 (1948).
REV. STAT. c. 100, see. 48 (1944);

'2 ME.

TEX. STAT., REv. CIV. art. 5431
(Vernon, 1936); W. VA. CODE ANN. sec. 5725 (1949).
"3 ARK. STAT. ANN. sec. 27-1149 (1947); 2 IAsrO CODE ANN. see. 5-811
(1948); KAN. GEN. STAT. ANNt. sec. 60-746 (1949); 2 Miss. CODE ANi. sec. 1479
(1942); 2 Mo. REV. STAT. ANN. sec. 509.210 (1949); 7 MoNT. REV. CODEs ANN.
see. 93.3813 (1947); 2 NEB. REv. STAT. sec. 25-840 (1943); 4 NEV. Comp. LAws
ANN.

sec. 8630 (Willyer, 1929); 2 N. M.

STAT.

ANN. see. 19-409 (1941); N. Y.

Civ. Pac. AcT sec. 338 (Thompson, 1939); 1 ORE. Col,. LAws ANN. see. 1-909
(1940); 1 S. C. CODE ANN. see. 483 (1942); 1 Wyo. Com,. STAT. ANN. sec.

3-141633(1945).
Am. Jun. 202-203 (1941).
143 CONN. GEN. STAT. REv. c. 390, see. 7983 (1949); 44

DEL. LAws

c. 177,
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5. Statutes providing that if there is a retraction, no puntive damages will be allowed, and the retraction can be
used in mitigation of the actual damages. 15
6. Statutes providing that if a retraction is made, only
"special damages" shall be allowed, special damages being defined to mean damages affecting the plaintiff's
pecuniary interests.16
It should be noted that the existing Kentucky statute is in
category five, placing Kentucky among the four states which are
the most lenient toward the person who publishes the defamatory
words. Still, at the January 1952 session of the Kentucky General
Assembly, House Bill No. 63,17 sponsored by the Kentucky Press
Association and the Kentucky Association of Broadcasters,' 8 was oitroduced in the House of Representatives. Section la of this bill
provides that if the newspaper, or television or radio station that
made the defamatory statement makes a conspicious and timely
correction, the defamed person shall recover no more than special
damages.
One change this new bill would make is that it would extend the
scope of relief by retraction to include visual and sound broadcasts. The Kentucky statute, as it stands, pertains only to newspapers. As has been stated previously, there is a need for legislation which would include all three of these modes of communication. Therefore, the new bill, insofar as it attempts to put radio
and television stations on the same footing with newspapers, is
worthwhile. However, this proposed amendment would do much
more than provide that the limitations now applied to newspapers
see. la (1943); 2 FLA. STAT. sec. 770.02 (1949); 2 I'ND. STAT. ANN. see. 2-1043
(Bums, 1933); 2 IOWA CODE sec. 659.2 (1946); MAss. Acrs Am REsOt.vEs sec.
360 (1943); 2a N. J, Rsv. STAT. sec. 43.2 (1951); 2c N. C. GEN. STAT. sec. 99-2
(1950); 2 N. D. REv. CODE sec. 14-0208 (1943) (Statutes says only damages to
property, business, trade, etc., will be allowed. However, this was construed to
mean that only exemplary damages are excluded, Meyerle v. Pioneer Pub. Co.,
45 N. D. 568, 178 N.W. 192 (1920)); 8 Omo GEN. CODE ANN. see. 11343 (Page,
1938) (Statute says only that retraction rebuts malice. It was then held that if
there is no malice, no punitive damages will be allowed. Moses Kahn v. Cincinnati Times Star, 10 Ohio Dec. 599 (1895); Mauk v. Brundage, 68 0. S. 89, 67

N.E. 152 (1903)); ORT.. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, sec. 1446a (1941); 3 S. D. CODE
see. 47.05404 (1939); 4 UTaH tit. 62, c. 2, see. 1 (1943); Wis. STAT. ANN. sec.
331.05(2) (1949).
'ALA.

(1948).

CODE ANNm.tit.

7, sec. 913, 914 (1940); Ky.

REv. STAT.

" CAL. CIv. CODE ANN. sec. 48a (1949); 2 MINN. STAT. sec.
" See Appendix section 1.

sec. 411.050

548.06 (1945).

" See Louisville Courier-Journal, March 19, 1952, see. 2, p. 1, col. 6.
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should apply to broadcasting stations. The bill would make four
other drastic changes in the Kentucky law of defamation which
are extremely favorable to newspapers and broadcasters which
haveThe
made
statements.
firstdefamatory
of these changes concerns the number
of official retractions to be made. The present Kentucky law1" provides that
a retraction, to be sufficient, must be made in at least two successive issues of the publication and be accompanied by editorials in
which the libelous statement is specifically repudiated. Under the
proposed amendment, one publication would be sufficient and no
editorial repudiation would be required. It has been said that
"thousands may have read the libelous matter that never saw its
refutation." 20 This conclusion is even more evident when only
one retraction is made. Thousands might have read the libelous
matter who didn't happen to read the one particular paper that
the retraction appeared in. It would seem that a person who had
been besmeared by a libelous attack is entitled to at least two
publications of the refutation, so that as many people as possible
might be reached and their false idea concerning the defamed person corrected. Specific editorial repudiations would also serve a
purpose; not only might additional people be reached, but those
who read both the retraction itself and the editorial would, by
repetition, have it firmly impressed upon them that the previous
statement was false.
Another change the new bill would make is in the content of
the retraction. Sections lb and lc of House Bill No. 63 provide
that when the plaintiff requests a correction, he must state wherein
the defamatory matter was false and set forth the true facts. It appears that requiring a defamed person to set forth the true facts
concerning matters in his private life is an encroachment upon his
privacy. A person should not be forced to open the pages of his
private life to public gaze because someone else made an error.
A correction is generally an acknowledgment that the prior
statement was false. Under this amendment the defendant would
have the alternative of publishing the plaintiff's true statement of
the facts. In other words, the disseminator "can just say, 'Jones
Ky. REv. STAT., sec. 411.050 (1948).

Cass v. New Orleans Times, 27 La. Ann. 214 (1875).
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says this isn't so.' And that is all." 21 This type of retraction would
do more to put the defamatory statement in issue than clear the
plaintiff's name. Generally it is not a retraction to publish a statement that the defamed person denied the charge. 22
A third pro-disseminator change the new bill would make concerns the presence or absence of malice. Section 411.050 of the
Kentucky Revised Statutes provides that a prerequisite to allowing
retraction in mitigation of damages is that the defamatory statement must have been "published without malice". There is no
mention of malice in the proposed amendment, which would
seem to mean that, even though a publisher disseminated the
libelous matter maliciously, he would be liable only for special
damages if he merely printed a correction. If this amendment had
been passed, one who printed a falsehood concerning another with
malicious intent to harm would be liable only to the same extent
as one who published a misstatement honestly think it was true.
The general rule is that one who maliciously publishes a defamatory statement is liable for punitive or vindictive damages. 23
The majority of the state statutes which provide that a public retraction of a libelous charge may be put in evidence on the issue
of damages limit the situations in which mitigation may be made
to those wherein the libelous charge was made without actual
malice. 24 Kentucky now stands with the majority and exacts a
special punishment for deliberate harm. Should it adopt this or a
similar amendment which would, in effect, legalize maliciousness?
Surely justice demands that a more stringent penalty be placed
upon those who act with malicious intent than upon those who
are guilty of negligence or mere mistake.
The most serious change that would be made by House Bill
No. 63 is in the amount of damages recoverable. Section la provides that the defamed person shall recover no more than "special
damages" if a correction is made. Section Ifdefines special damages as "pecuniary damages which the plaintiff alleges and proves
he has suffered in respect to his property, business, trade, profes= Supra note 18.
" 33 Am. Juir. 122 (1941).
" McCo
cK, DAArEs 430 (1935).
'For example see 3 CoNN. GEN. STAT. REv.
c. 390 sec. 7983 (1949); 2a
N. J. REv. STAT. sec. 43.2 (1951); 2c N. C.GEN. STAT. see. 99-2 (1950); OKLA.
STAT. ANN.tit. 12, sec. 1446a (1941).
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sion or occupation, and no other." This is the same type of damages that the common law exacts in cases of slander when the
words are not standerous per se; a type that cannot be found in
many fact situations even though the plaintiff has been seriously
injured; a type about which an eminent authority has said "while
the loss of customers, or business, or a particular contract, or employment, or of an advantageous marriage will be sufficient to
make the slander actionable, it is not enough that the plaintiff
has lost the society of his friends and associates . . .or that he

has suffered acute mental distress and serious physical illness as a
result of the defamation." 25 Thus, under the proposed amendment, a person whose reputation had been disastrously affected
by a defamatory attack could recover nothing if his income was
not impaired. Such an amendment would make all housewives,
students, pensions-holders, and coupon clippers fair game for
libelous attacks.
It is submitted that a person's right to be secure in his good
name could not be constitutionally limited in this manner. Prior
to 1904 an existing Kansas statute2 0 provided that if the defendant
alleged and proved that the libelous matter was printed in good
faith and a sufficient retraction was made, the plaintiff could recover only actual damages. Actual damages were defined as being
those suffered by the plaintiff in respect to his property, business,
trade, profession or occupation, and no others. It will be noted
that this statute was, in effect, similar to the proposed Kentucky
amendment, except that the Kansas statute, unlike the amendment, did demand good faith. A case requiring a construction of
this statute came before the Supreme Court of Kansas in 1904.27

This court held that the statute in question was unconstitutional,
saying:
"There is no room for holding in a constitutional system,
that private reputation is any more subject to be removed
by statute from full legal protection, than life, liberty or
property.... We are well persuaded that the criticized act

takes from the libeled person the right of remedy by due
course of law for an injury suffered in his reputation, and
=Pnossm, TORTS 805, 806 (1941).
KAN. GEN. STAT. c. 576 (1901) as cited in Hanson v. Krehbiel, 68 Kan. 824,
75 P.1041 (1904).
' Hanson v. Krehbiel, 68 Kan. 824, 75 P. 1041 (1904).

DEFAATION

hence is invalid under the quoted constitutional provision
(fourteenth amendment). '"28

A statute allowing only pecuniary damages after retraction, if
the defendant had acted in good faith, 29 was also held unconstitutional in Michigan,3° the court saying that such statute deprived
the defamed one of an adequate remedy at law. As a matter of
justice, it was said that "Exploded lies are continually reproduced
without the antidote, and no one can measure with any accurate
standard the precise amount of evil done or probable".3 1
An Ohio statute which provided that the defamed person
could elect to stand on his common law rights or waive a part of
the damage by demanding a retraction 32 was also held unconstitutional, the court saying that the legislature did not give the people
their constitutional rights and it could not take them away.33
Pecuniary damage statutes passed in three other states, 34 although not held unconstitutional, were construed by the courts to
mean either that such damages included everything but punitive, 35
or that the statute merely meant that the retraction could be
pleaded in mitigation of general damages. 3 The court deciding
the last case, by way of dictum, said that a person's reputation is
in the nature of a property right, and thus, any attempt by the
legislature to take away the plaintiff's remedy at law would be unconstitutional.
There have been decisions in only two states, Minnesota 7 and
California,38 which have held pecuniary damage statutes constitutional, and in the California case there was a strong dissent which
asserted that the statute was unconstitutional not only under the
Id. at 1043.
MicH. ComP. LAws sec. 3, p. 354 (1885).
'Park v. The Detroit Free Press Co., 72 Mich. 560, 40 N.W. 731 (1888).
In accord, McGee v. Baumgartner, 121 Mich. 287, 80 N.W. 21 (1889).
n Id. at 733.
' 2 REv. STAT. Omo sec. 5094 (1900).
' Byers v. Meridian Printing Co., 84 0. S. 408, 95 N.E. 917 (1911).
"2 N. J. CoMP. STAT. sec. 226 (1910); N. C. LAws c. 557, sec. 1 (1901);
N. D. Comp. LAws see. 9562 (1913).
' Lindsey v. Evening Journal Association, 10 N. J. M. 1275, 163 A. 245
(1932); Osborn v. Leach, 135 N. C. 628,47 S.E. 811 (1904).
- Meyerle v. Pioneer Publishing Co., 45 N. D. 568, 178 N.W. 792, 794
'"

(1920).

'Allen v. Pioneer Press Co., 40 Minn. 180, 41 N.W. 936 (1889) (Statute
requires good faith).
'Werner v. Southern California Associated Newspapers, 35 Cal. 121, 216 P.

2d 825 (1950).
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"due process of law" clause, but also under the "equal protection
of the law" clause of the fourteenth amendment. The dissenting
justice said, in part:
"I submit that the legislation in question makes an
actual, palpable, wholly unreasonable and arbitrary classification. Newspapers and radio broadcasts are singled out for
the extension of a privilege which is not given to individuals,
magazine publishers, or other periodicals, sky-writers, sound
trucks, banner-bearing dirigibles, and bill-boards, and probably television and motion picture producers."39
Since only two out of eight states that have considered pecuniary damage statutes have upheld them as constitutional, the
majority view would seem to be that statutes such as the proposed
Kentucky amendment are not valid under the federal constitution.
It is also to be doubted that such an amendment would be valid
under the constitution of Kentucky itself. The Kentucky constitution provides: "All courts shall be open, and every person for an
injury done him in his lands, goods, person or reputation, shall
have remedy by due course of law, and right and justice administered without sale, denial or delay." 40 (Writer's italics). Thus, in
this constitution there is an express provision that an injured
reputation requires relief by due process of law. Under the
amendment, if a retraction is made, the defamed person could recover money damages if there were any, and nothing if no money
damages had arisen. There would be no mention of damages for
the injured reputation; there would be no relief for the injured
reputation. The amendment would completely do away with any
remedy for the plaintiff's loss of reputation and, it is submitted,
would be unconstitutional under Section 14 of the Constitution
of Kentucky.
The Kentucky Constitution also provides: "All men . . . are
equal; and no grant of exclusive, separate public emoluments or
privileges shall be made to any man or set of men.. ."41 (Writer's
italics). It is arguable that the proposed amendment would give
exclusive privileges to newspapers and visual or sound broadcasters. If a defamatory statement was made by a newspaper it
"Id. at -, 216 P. 2d at 836.
'KY. CONST. sec. 14.
' Id. sec. S.
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need merely retract and thereby limit its liability to special damages; but if the defamatory statement was made by an individual,
he could admit his error and apologize repeatedly and still be
liable for general damages. Is this equal protection under the
42
laws?
It has been contended that such statutes do not constitute
privilege because they include all newspapers and all broadcasters,
and this particular class must be free to disseminate the news and
must be protected from excessively large jury verdicts.43 However,
it must be remembered that "Liberty is not license". Freedom to
disseminate news must not encroach upon the individual's inherent constitutional rights. Disseminators contend that they
should have this special right because upon them lies the special
burden of turning out news rapidly with the help of proof readers
and announcers, over whose negligence, malicious errors, or ad
libs the owners have little control. 44 However, it is to be noted
that a special right of this sort might well take away all incentive
to attempt to control the negligence of employees at the expense
of the individual. Too, disseminators can spread the risk by owning insurance to protect them from actions of this kind; while it
would be extremely impractical for each individual to insure himself against defamation. As to the excessively large jury verdicts,
it has been said, "The assertion . . .that juries are disposed to

make excessive awards of damages against newspapers and radio
stations in actions of this character is not only an unjust reflection
upon our jury system, but is factually and historically untrue." 45
Thus, not only as a question of expediency but also as a question
of inalienable constitutional rights, an amendment substituting retraction for general damages should not be passed in Kentucky.
Section (2) of House Bill No. 63 states that if someone other
than the owner of the broadcasting station or his agent utters the
defamatory matter, the action shall be dismissed unless the plaintiff proves that the owner or his agent failed to exercise due care.
""Their purpose (Sections 3 and 26 of the Ky. Constitution) was to place
all persons similarly situated upon a plane of equality under the law, and to fix it
so that it would be impossible for any class to obtain preferred treatment .
Fisher v. Grieb, 272 Ky. 166, 169, 113 S.W. 2d 1139, 1140 (1938).
"Supra note 38.
" See 1951 VAsH. U. L.

Q.

133.

" Supra note 38 at -, 216 P. 2d at 836. (The writer went on to cite statistics
as to jury verdicts against newspapers in California.)
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By majority view, the laws of defamation and not the laws of negligence apply to libelous statements made on the radio. 46 Under the
laws of defamation the disseminator is held absolutely liable for
47
any defamatory matter whether he was negligent or not.

The law of radio defamation is in its infancy and authorities
differ as to whether such defamation should be considered slander,4 8 libel,49 or a separate tort.50 It is submitted that legislation
concerning radio and television defamation is needed, but the
foregoing amendment would place too much of the burden upon
the plaintiff. If the broadcasting station proved that neither the
owner nor his agents were negligent, the plaintiff's only recourse
would be to track down the malicious or negligent person, be he
announcer, script writer, or janitor, and then prove the negligence.
This would be an impractical if not impossible task to place on
the plaintiff who, if by chance he procured a judgment, would
often find it unenforceable. ".

.

. there is no need and no justifica-

tion for such sacrifice of passive and innocent victims in order to
favor the most powerful and most dangerous agency for defamation that the world has ever seen." 51 As was previously stated, the
disseminator could insure himself against such risks, while such
insurance taken out by individuals would be frivilous. It may occasionally be harsh to award a judgment against the radio station
for the maliciousness or negligence of someone not in its regular
employ, but it would be harsher still to let the uninsured plaintiff
suffer injury by defamation without recourse. It seems that a
balancing of interests would leave the burden on the radio station
which is, after all, engaged in the business of dissemination of programs and is receiving the profits from the use of its facilities.
If the station is not the direct employer of every radio "artist", it
should, at least retain some ultimate responsibility beyond that
of a lessor.
There is also a proviso in Section (2) of House Bill No. 63
which asserts that the radio station shall "in no event" be.liable
4"44 Am. Jun. 196 (1942).
' 7 Vold, Defamation by Radio, 19 MYNN. L. REv. 611, 613 (1934-5).

"Meldrum v. Australian Broadcasting Co., Ltd., Vict. L. B. 425 (1932).
' Sorenson v.Wood, 123 Neb. 348, 243 N.W. 82 (1932).
' Summit Hotel Co. v. National Broadcasting Co., 336 Pa. 182, 8 A. 2d 802
(1939).
'

Void, supra note 47, at 660.
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for any defamatory utterances made by a person speaking as a
candidate for public office. This section was probably included to
protect the broadcaster from a recent ruling of the Federal Communications Commission which provides:
"If any licensee shall permit any person who is a legally
qualified candidate for any public office to use a broadcasting station, he shall afford equal opportunities to all other
such candidates for that office in the use of such broadcasting station.... Provided, that such licensee shall have no
power of censorship over the material broadcast under the
provisions of this section. No obligation is imposed upon
any licensee2 to allow the use of its station by any such
5
candidate."
This limitation upon censorship was recently held to be
absolute even in the case of material which is libelous.53 The
broadcaster may be placed in a precarious position by this legislation. If he allows one candidate to use the broadcasting facilities, he must open his doors to others, and he is not permitted to
censor any of their material. Thus, if any defamatory statements
were made, he might be unavoidably liable in a civil action.
In this situation we must again balance the interests, and it
seems only just that the broadcaster, rendered helpless by an administrative rule, should be protected as against the victim who
may still seek relief from the speaker himself. 4 To suggest that
no radio station allow any political candidate to use its facilities
is an absurdity, but this would be the broadcaster's only method
of self protection. Protection might, therefore, reasonably be offered to the broadcasters by the state legislatures. 5 It is believed
that the proviso in Section (2) of the proffered bill is worthwhile,
except that it does not limit the immunity to situations in which
an owner or agent of the station did not take part. Under this
"48

STAT. 1088 (1934), 47 U. S. C. see. 315 (1941).
"Port Huron Broadcasting Co., Docket No. 6987, Jan. 30, 1948, 4 Pike and
Fischer Radio Reg. 1 (1948).
'"For further discussion of this subject see Remmers, Recent Legislative
Trends in Defamation by Radio, 64 HA.v. L. rv. 727 at 747 (1950-51).
"It is to be noted that the FCC in the Port Huron case (supra note 53) held
that a broadcaster could not be liable in a civil action under state law because the
federal law has "occupied the field". However, the Supreme Court has not yet
passed on the ruling. It is suggested that a state law similar to the proviso in
House Bill No. 63 is none the less desirable since the Supreme Court might decide
that the federal law does not "occupy the field", or even that the federal legislation
is unconstitutional.
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amendment the station owner or agent could sanction or even
promote the defamation and still be protected by the immunity.
The bill in question, House Bill No. 63, although passed by
the House of Representatives, did not pass the Kentucky Senate.
Instead, the Senate introduced and passed Committee Substitute
for House Bill No. 6356 which, after setting out details fair to both
plaintiff and defendant as to where and when a retraction should
be made, provides that if the retraction is made and there is an
absence of malice, no punitive damages shall be recovered, and
the retraction may be considered in mitigation of other damages.
This second proposal also applied to newspapers. and visual or
sound radio broadcasts, and it would make the three media liable
to the same extent for defamation under a codification similar to
the rules now applied in Kentucky in cases of newspaper defamation. It is submitted that legislation is certainly needed in this
field. A bill similar to the second proposed amendment should
be passed, so that the law on defamation and retraction as pertaining to newspapers will apply to broadcasts, and will be clear
and just to both the disseminator and the victim.
DIANNE LouIsE

McKAIG

APPENDIX
SECTION I
House Bill No. 63 introduced January, 1952 to the Ky. House of Representatives.
(1) (a) In any action for damages for the publication of a defamatory statement in a daily or other newspaper, or by a visual or sound radio broadcast, the
plaintiff shall recover no more than special damages unless he shall allege and
prove that he made a sufficient demand for correction and that the newspaper, or
the radio or television broadcasting station, failed to make conspicuous and timely
publication of said correction.
(b) A "sufficient demand for correction" is a demand for correction which
is in writing; which is signed by the plaintiff or his duly authorized attorney or
agent; which specifies the statement or statements claimed to be false and defamatory, states wherein they are false, and sets forth the true facts; and which is
delivered to the defendant prior to the commencement of the action.
(c) A "correction" is either (i) the publication of an acknowledgment that
the statement or statements specified as false and defamatory in the plaintiff's
demand for correction are erroneous, or (ii) the publication of the plaintiffs
statement of the true facts (as set forth in his demand for correction) or a fair
summary thereof, exclusive of any portions thereof which are defamatory of anAppendix section 2,

other, obscene, or otherwise improper for publication. If the demand for correction has specified two or more statements as false and defamatory, the correction may deal with some of such statements pursuant to (i) above and with
other of such statements pursuant to (ii) above.
(d) A "conspicuous publication" in a newspaper is a publication which is
printed in substantially as conspicuous a manner as the statement or statements
specified as false and defamatory in the demand for correction; and for this purpose the Sunday and daily issues of a newspaper shall be deemed equivalent. A
"conspicuous publication" in a visual or sound radio broadcast is a publication
which is broadcast at substantially the same time of day, and with the same sending power, as the statement or statements specified as false and defamatory in
the demand for correction. A publication in a particular manner which'is agreeable to the plaintiff shall in any event be deemed "conspicuous."
(e) A "timely publication" in a daily newspaper is a publication within
three business days after the day on which a sufficient demand for correction
is received by the defendant. A "timely publication" in a newspaper other
than a daily newspaper is a publication in or prior to the next regular issue
which is published not less than three business days after the day on which a
sufficient demand for correction is received by the defendant. For'this purpose
the Sunday and daily issues of a newspaper shall be deemed equivalent. A "timely
publication" in a visual or sound radio broadcast is a publication within three
business days after the day on which a sufficient demand for correction is received
by the defendant. A "business day" is any day other than a Sunday or legal holiday. A publication in a particular issue or on a particular day which is agreeable
to the plaintiff shall in any event be deemed "timely."
(f) "Special damages" are pecuniary damages which the plaintiff alleges and
proves that he has suffered in respect to his property, business, trade, profession,
or occupation (including such amounts of money as the plaintiff alleges and
proves he has expended as a proximate result of the alleged defamation), and no
other.
(2) If in any action for damages for the publication of a defamatory statement on a visual or sound radio broadcast, the defendant proves that said defamatory statement has been uttered by one other than the owner, licensee, or
operator of the broadcasting station or one acting as the agent or employee of
said owner, licensee or operator, the action shall be dismissed unless the plaintiff
shall allege and prove that such owner, licensee, operator, agent or employee has
failed to exercise due care to prevent the publication of said statment in said
broadcast; provided, however, that in no event shall the owner, operator or licensee of a radio or television broadcasting station, or one acting as the agent
or employee of such owner, operator or licensee, be held liable for the utterance
of a defamatory statement in a visual or sound radio broadcast over the facilities
of such station by any person spcaking as a legally qualified candidate for public
office.

SECTION II
Committee Substitute for House Bill No. 63.
(1) In any action for damages for the publication of an alleged erroneous
and defamatory statement by a newspaper, or by visual or sound radio station, the
defendant shall be entitled to allege and offer proof that said statement was published without malice, and that the plaintiff failed to demand a retraction in the
manner provided by subsection (2) of this section, or that the defendant made
a retraction in the manner provided by subsections (3) and (4), or by subsection
(5), of this section;
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(2) Each demand for retraction shall be in writing, and shall be signed by
the person, or by his attorney or agent, who desires retraction of a particular statement, and shall specify wherein the statement is claimed to be erroneous and defamatory;
(3) Each retraction of an alleged erroneous and defamatory statement that is
made by a newspaper after receipt by it of demand therefor, as described in subsection (2) of this section shall, if the newspaper is a daily newspaper, be first
published in a regular issue thereof within three business days (exclusive of Sundays and holidays) immediately following receipt by such newspaper of said demand for retraction. If the newspaper is not a daily newspaper, such retraction
shall be published either in the next regular issue thereof immediately following
receipt of said demand for retraction, or in the next regular issue thereof that is
published more than three business days (exclusive of Sundays and holidays) immediately following receipt by such newspaper of said demand for retraction.
Each retraction of an alleged erroneous and defamatory statement that is made
by a visual or sound radio station after receipt by it of demand therefor, as
described in subsection (2) of this section, shall be broadcast by such station
within three days immediately following receipt by such station of said demand
for retraction;
(4) For the purposes of this section, a retraction shall be an accurate correction or explanation of the statement complained of, and shall be published in
the following manner:
(a) In the case of a newspaper, the retraction shall be published in as conspicuous and public a manner as that in which the alleged defamatory statement
was published, and shall be in the same type and in the same place in at least two
successive issues of the same publication, accompanied by editorials retracting
the alleged defamatory statement.
(b) In the case of a visual or sound radio station, the retraction shall be
broadcast from the same station at substantially the same time of day, and with
the same sending power, as the alleged defamatory statement was broadcast;
(5) Any newspaper, or visual or sound radio station, may, prior to receiving
a demand for retraction as described in subsection (2) of this section, publish or
broadcast a retraction of any erroneous statement in the manner prescribed in subsection (4) of this section, regardless of whether same is, or is not, defamatory;
(6) Allegations and proof of any of the matters set out in subsection (1) of
this section shall prevent the recovery of puntive damages, and may be considered
in mitigation of other damages.

